The article justifies the illegitimacy of views in the legal literature on justice as an essential feature of law: recognition of its universality is excluded, since the subject of legal regulation is not limited to the sphere of validity of the principle of justice, and certain legal relations do not correspond to it at all (for example, technical, production, educational, procedural relations, etc.)
in the simplest and historically first economic relationship of exchange.
The participants in the exchange had no need to enter into a legal relation so that the existing thing could be exchanged for another such thing, because only under this condition the principle of "equal for the equal" is preserved.
Other motives form the basis of the exchange -to obtain the ownership of a thing that the subject does not have, but recognizes it as vitally necessary and, in order to satisfy this need, is ready to give an equivalent but different thing. A canvas is exchanged for grain, a tool of labourfor jewellery. In any case, different things can be objects of the exchange and by virtue of this; the exchange can only be equivalent, but not equal for equal. In this case, equivalence may have certain fluctuations in one direction or another, the subject may be wrong in estimating the use value of the acquired thing, may be placed in such conditions that an equivalent exchange is impossible for the objective reasons, as it is in the case of hiring workforce by a capitalist, an entrepreneur.
The relations that people enter into in the process of social production of material and spiritual benefits constitute a considerable, if not the greater, part of public relations regulated by the law. All such relations oriented to obtaining a socially useful result are determined by the specifics of the created material benefit, by the ways and methods of its creation, the requirements of economical efficiency, public and environmental safety, but remain neutral with respect to any ideological assessments, including assessments of their fair distribution. Firstly, these are the technical-production (technological) relations associated with production of any material benefits; secondly, the relations that arise and exist in the process of conducting educational activities, medical assistance, transportation and other services; thirdly, the procedural relations in the sphere of activity of the law-making bodies, as well as the court and other law enforcement bodies.
The process of production of material benefits carried out by a group of people (sometimes a very significant one) is focused on obtaining a certain result and, due to the specialization and cooperation of production, requires a high degree of co-ordination of the actions of employees. It is required to preliminary determine the sequence of technological procedures, the appropriate raw materials and other material resources, to select and arrange personnel, etc., to carry out packaging and shipment of finished products in a timely manner. Such complex and harmonious work is achieved, among other things, thanks to the system of normative legal acts (regulations on the operating procedure of structural subdivisions, job descriptions, various kinds of schedules, regulations on reporting procedures, etc.).
The regulatory prescriptions aimed at the final result of the activity contained in these acts can be efficient or inefficient, economic or uneconomic, consistent or contradictory, complete or incomplete, whatsoever, but the criterion of justice is not applicable to them.
Because in the technical-production processes, there are no relations of equalization, distribution or rewarding, which fall under the criteria of justice. The above-said, of course, does not apply to the industrial economic relations (relations of ownership of tools and means of production, exchange, employer-employee relations, etc.), where, as noted earlier, the above criterion operates in full force and without any exceptions. Tsybulevskaia that not all laws, even those based on an understanding of justice, can be moral (Tsybulevskaia, 2004, p. 14) . In view of the above circumstances, we must either recognize the rules of law regulated without regard to the principle of justice as non-legal, or justice -as a non-universal and non-essential feature of law. Since it is not possible to throw out a large part of legal rules outside the law for the sake of the theory of natural law, the inconsistent theory of law has to be brought into line with objective reality, and the principle of justice has to be recognized as a specific feature of the rules of law that governs only distributive relations. In any way this principle cannot apply to the entire system of law, a significant part of which is neutral to it, and some part of rules related to the sphere (Pokrovskii, 1998, pp. 309-310) . 
